The Black Sea: Center of the nuclear black market
The Black Sea region is the center of the world’s nuclear black market, with Russia being the known or suspected source of most nuclear contraband and Turkey the preferred destination. To date, known attempts at nuclear smuggling have been unsuccessful, because the insiders who stole fissile material were not experienced at finding buyers and moving the material across country borders. Recently, however, organized crime appears to have become involved in some nuclear trafficking. Such involvement threatens to change the nuclear terrorism equation, providing the marketing and transportation expertise previously lacking. The US response to nuclear smuggling is handled by the Defense Department and the Energy Department. These agencies have few capabilities for dealing with organized crime, and the countries of the Black Sea region tend not to share nuclear information with one another. Unless international coordination and law enforcement are improved, criminal organizations will likely be able to supply terrorists sufficient fissile material to build an atomic bomb.
The Black Sea region is one of the world’s critical crossroads, a strategic intersection of east — west and north — south corridors that enable the free flow of people, ideas, and goods from Asia to Europe and from former Soviet territory to the Middle East and Africa. It is also the center of the world’s nuclear black market.
The greatest potential sources of nuclear contraband are Russia, Pakistan, and countries that possess nuclear research reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU). With nearly 11,000 nuclear warheads, Russia owns the largest arsenal in the world and the most weapon-grade material. Countries occupying former Soviet space have about a third of the world’s HEU-fueled research reactors. Pakistan has 90 — 100 nuclear warheads, is building new plutonium-manufacturing capacity, and faces a dangerous and growing insider threat to its nuclear stockpiles.
The most pressing danger is not that terrorists will acquire a working atomic bomb in this region. Except for Pakistan, the security of nuclear warheads has improved. Nuclear weapons storage facilities are well guarded, and the chances of a terrorist group gaining access by force of arms are very small. The insider threat in Pakistan is kept in check somewhat by its nation-state status. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen if a nuclear warhead traceable to Pakistan were detonated in a Western city. The threat of retaliation is still effective there.
The real threat of nuclear terrorism stems from the world’s growing stockpiles of plutonium and HEU, both of which can be used to make crude atomic bombs. A recent US — Russian report catalogs nearly 2,000 metric tons of these materials, which are stored in hundreds of buildings in 30 countries under security conditions that range from “excellent to appalling.” The combination of fissile material and poor security greatly increases the probability that some of it will end up in terrorist hands.
Until recently, insiders who illicitly obtained fissile material were regularly arrested; they knew what to steal but not how to sell it. Over the past several years, however, organized crime groups in the Black Sea area appear to have become involved in nuclear smuggling. Their knowledge of smuggling tactics and poor coordination among local law enforcement agencies make it likely that—unless the United States significantly steps up its law enforcement efforts in the region—terrorists will eventually be able to buy enough fissile material to make at least a crude atomic device.
Harvard’s Project on Managing the Atom has published a comprehensive report on this threat, combining several well-known facts to create an unsettling picture. …